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Consumer protection is a central policy objective at the 
European level, enshrined in Art. 169 TFEU, which is 
defended through a genuine European Union (EU) consumer 
rights policy. A well-known area of EU consumer rights policy 
is the case of passenger rights, with the most prominent 
example being EU airline passenger rights. Currently, this 
example is used in discussions about an extension of rail 
passenger rights, which could be aligned with the existing 
airline regulation (European Parliament 2018). In this 
context, it is timely to review the case of airline passenger 
rights to draw broader conclusions from it.  
To do so, this policy brief first presents the design of the EU 
passenger rights regulation, before studying its impact on 
airline service. As we show in Gnutzmann and Śpiewanowski 
(2018), the regulation has not only strengthened the 
protection of passengers on severely delayed or cancelled 
flights (insurance component), but also increased the 
reliability of EU airlines across the board (service quality 
component). The service quality effect is an important 
potential welfare effect of consumer rights regulation. While 
the share of severely delayed passengers is generally very low, 
all passengers benefit from increased efforts exerted by 
airlines in raising reliability. This is the case if the regulation 
imposes sufficient costs on carriers to act as an effective 
incentive to raise reliability. In the airline industry, 
competition has not resolved problems of delay (Ater & Orlov 
2015). Soft-touch regulations, such as the US delay disclosure 
program, appear to have been similarly ineffective (Forbes et 
al. 2015). This points to the important potential role of 
passenger rights in raising airline quality. 
Additionally, the policy brief considers the broader 
implications of the findings. The experience of airline 
passenger rights holds important insights for the design of 
consumer protection policy more generally, especially 
regarding monetary compensation. First, compensating 
passengers generously for delay may be justified partially due 
to its incentive effects on transportation providers. Second, 
the existence of compensation can also mobilize private 
sector resources to increase enforcement. In the case of 
airline passenger rights, intermediary agencies have 
proliferated which help passengers receive delay 
compensation on a contingent fee basis. 
EU Air Passenger Rights 
Aimed at “ensuring a high level of protection for passengers”, 
the European Union laid down air passenger rights in Regula-
tion 261/2004 (henceforth EC261). Consumers enjoy protec-
tion under this regulation in case of “long delay”, defined as 
arrival at the final destination occurring at least three hours 
behind schedule. Thus, missed connecting flights qualify as a 
reason for long delay. In these cases (including denied board-
ing and cancelled flights), passengers have a right to care and 
assistance. This includes free phone calls, meal vouchers and 
Executive Summary 
> Flight delay is a widespread quality problem in 
the airline industry, with the average flight be-
ing delayed by more than 10 minutes. 
> The problem is addressed by the Air Passenger 
Rights Regulation (“EC261”) on flight delay, a 
flagship EU consumer protection policy. 
> Under the regulation, airlines are liable for 
providing care as well as substantial cash com-
pensation for passengers in case of long delays.  
> These provisions provide incentives for airlines 
to improve service quality, substantially reduc-
ing the likelihood of flights being delayed.  
> The key to success is enforcement. In case of air-
line delay, this has been achieved partly 
through the market: The regulation created in-
centives for claim agencies to emerge. 
> As illustrated by the case of air passenger rights, 
consumer rights policy thus not only provides 
insurance, but can also improve service quality. 
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– in case of overnight stays – hotel accommodation, which 
must be fully covered by the operating carrier. Such care 
must always be granted, irrespective of who is at fault for the 
delay. Additionally, passengers receive the right to claim cash 
compensation for lost time, which is due unless the airline 
can prove the delay was caused by “exceptional circum-
stances”. This cash compensation is substantial – between 
EUR 250 and EUR 600, depending on route and length of de-
lay – and not limited to the ticket price. The regulation is man-
datory, so passengers and airlines cannot agree through con-
ditions of carriage to limit or waive rights created by the reg-
ulation. 
European air passenger rights in case of delay are exception-
ally strong compared to other major aviation markets (for a 
survey, see ICAO 2013) or other modes of transport. To un-
derstand the success of the EC261, it is insightful to discuss 
the policy alternatives related to flight delay applied in other 
regions: prohibitive fines, third party insurance and infor-
mation disclosure. 
 Fines paid to regulator: To limit the inconvenience of 
the passengers forced to wait on-board, the US Depart-
ment of Transport introduced in 2010 the so-called tar-
mac delay rule, a system of penalties for keeping passen-
gers on-board over three (domestic) or four hours (inter-
national) before the take-off or after landing without the 
opportunity to deplane. Airlines who violate the rule 
face fines of up to $27,500 per passenger. These fines 
are prohibitive, and indeed the number of reported in-
stances of tarmac delay dropped from nearly 700 in the 
12 months before the rule was introduced to just 20 
cases in the 12 subsequent months. This outcome can be 
regarded as a success of the policy. The solution it pro-
vides comes at a relatively low cost, as passengers can 
be deplaned and replaned if the tarmac delay ap-
proaches the threshold value. Thus, the policy does not 
decrease the total delay. Furthermore, the fines intro-
duced by this policy are transferred to the authorities in-
stead of the affected passengers. Thus, in contrast to 
EC261, the tarmac delay rule does not contain the insur-
ance component that is beneficial to the consumer. 
 Third party insurance: A few airlines outside of the 
EU offer their customers third party insurance packages 
that include compensation for flight delay. The clear ad-
vantage is the voluntarism of the approach, which im-
plies that the contract cannot generate welfare loss to 
any of the consumers. At the same time, the policy does 
not create incentives for carriers to reduce airline delay, 
even if the costs involved are relatively low.  
 Information disclosure: Economic theory suggests 
that service quality should be reflected in prices. Airlines 
with better on-time record should enjoy a price pre-
mium. The premium should, in return, provide incentives 
for the airlines to improve their service quality. This idea 
encouraged the US Department of Transport to regularly 
publish data on on-time performance of US carriers on 
domestic flights, specifically the share of flights arriving 
within 15 minutes of the scheduled departure time. 
However, as studies show (see, e.g., Forbes et al. 2015), 
the policy has had no impact on the average flight delays. 
Instead, airlines were found to be involved in ‘gaming’ 
the rule, that is strategically increasing scheduled flight 
times to reduce measured delay, and reduced delay only 
on the flights about to miss the cut. Alternative 
measures of on-time performance (e.g. mean or median 
delay) could thus suit the purpose of reducing the delay 
better. Nevertheless, for information disclosure to be ef-
fective, passengers need to be willing to incur infor-
mation processing costs.  
These alternative policies place a lower weight on consumer 
protection. In all cases, the insurance component of the EU 
passenger rights regulation is missing. Furthermore, the ex-
isting literature finds weak or no evidence of impact of these 
tools on delay reduction.  
EU passenger rights are far-ranging in scope and impose con-
siderable obligations on airlines; thus, for any cost-benefit 
analysis, it is essential to understand the benefit delivered to 
consumers through the regulation. We now turn to address-
ing this empirical question. 
Identifying the impact of EU Air Passenger Rights regulation 
Coverage of the EU Air Passenger Rights regulation is broad 
but not universal. All flights departing from an airport located 
in the EU fall under the scope of EC261. The situation is more 
complex for routes involving a non-EU airport (“extra-EU 
routes”). All flights departing from an EU airport, whether op-
erated by a European airline or not, are subject to the regula-
tion. However, on flights bound for an EU airport, but origi-
nating outside the EU, only flights operated by EU carriers fall 
under the regulation. Non-EU carriers do not fall under the 
regulation when departing from a non-EU airport. But on the 
return flight – departing from the EU but bound for non-EU 
destinations – also non-EU carriers are covered. The pattern 
of EC261 coverage and remedies is illustrated in Figure 1.   
Figure 1: Applicability of EU Passenger Rights 
This within-route variation in regulation coverage is unique 
and allows for assessing the effectiveness of the regulation 
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based on an analysis of scheduled and actual flight times of 
all scheduled commercial flights on the top 15 most traffic in-
tensive extra-EU airport pairs as well as of additional routes 
not subject to EC261 over an 8-month sample period, from 
November 2016 to July 2017 (Gnutzmann & Śpiewanowski 
2018). 
The study finds an economically important and statistically 
significant effect of EC261 regulation on both departure and 
arrival delay, as well as on on-time performance. The model 
attributes a departure delay reduction of 4.92 minutes on av-
erage to the EC261 regulation, after controlling for airline-
hub status, route-time fixed effects and airline-fixed effects. 
This estimate is certainly significant compared to an average 
departure delay of 10 minutes on international routes, and 
economically important. Statistically, the result allows for 
very robustly rejecting the hypothesis that EC261 has no ef-
fect. The same holds for arrival delay, where the estimated 
EC261 impact is 3.90 minutes of delay reduction.  We also find 
that EC261 is associated with a 5% improvement in ‘on-time 
performance’ (i.e. whether arrival delay is below 15 minutes).  
These results show that EC261 has an important impact on 
flight quality through improving mean performance, rather 
than reducing the likelihood of extremely poor performance. 
At first sight, this appears surprising because the liability 
events under the regulation focus on long delays. However, it 
is important to note that delay at final destination is what 
matters for the regulation: carriers operating connecting 
flights have a strong incentive to make sure their passengers 
do not miss connections. 
These delay reductions of EC261 cannot be explained by 
‘gaming’. The fact that EC261 has a strong effect on departure 
delay already rules out schedule padding as an alternative ex-
planation. Airlines affected by the EC261 regulation actually 
operate on tighter schedules than their unregulated compet-
itors, partly reflecting differences in aircraft fleet. Overall, 
there is strong evidence that EC261 air passenger rights – and 
thus regulation – lead to a meaningful improvement in airline 
service quality.  
This is not the case for alternative, purely market-based pol-
icy tools. In the airline industry, fiercer competition does not 
necessarily lead to more punctual flights. Competition may 
actually increase delays (Ater & Orlov 2015), although in 
other settings a positive correlation between route competi-
tion and on-time performance has been found (Mazzeo 
2003). This makes it important to understand how passenger 
rights regulation interacts with route competition. One possi-
ble mechanism is that under low competition, airlines under-
take little effort to reduce delays. In this case, the marginal 
cost of delay reduction is likely to be low, and the regulation 
can have a significant effect. A test of this hypothesis yields 
that passenger rights regulation is especially effective on 
routes where competition is low. The effect ranges from 2.53 
minutes of delay reduction on the most competitive routes to 
7.78 minutes on the least competitive routes (Gnutzmann & 
Śpiewanowski 2018).  
Policy recommendations 
Since EC261 has imposed significant costs to the airlines, es-
timated at over 0.6% of airline revenues, the coverage of the 
regulation is, unsurprisingly, criticized by airlines as excessive. 
This critique was especially pronounced in the aftermath of 
the Eyjafjallajökull volcano eruption in 2010. Once the vol-
cano ash had settled and air traffic was fully restored, airlines 
calculated the costs of care imposed on them by these “ex-
traordinary circumstances” and the European Commission 
commenced deliberations on possible amendments to the 
rule (EC 2013). Although its proposals have not been imple-
mented, they touch on several controversial areas of EC261, 
making them a useful starting point for further discussion.  
 Enforcement: As compensation has to be actively 
sought by the affected passengers, awareness of the 
regulation is crucial, and it has been steadily rising over 
the last years. The claim rates have been increasing 
thanks to information requirements as well as the emer-
gence of so-called “claims agencies”. These agencies 
charge a contingency fee to distressed passengers and 
credibly threaten to sue airlines in case of non-compli-
ance. Overall, significant improvements have been 
achieved in this dimension without regulatory changes. 
This is possible thanks to the relatively generous com-
pensation amounts, which make the claims agency busi-
ness models possible. This suggests that, as long as com-
pensation amounts are not reduced substantially, prior-
ities for passenger rights reform should be placed else-
where. 
 Compensation conditions: The most obvious dimen-
sion of potential change is the monetary value of the 
compensation or conditions under which the compensa-
tion is disbursed. The 2013 Commission document sug-
gested an increase in definition of long delay to five to 
nine hours, depending on the distance. This would be a 
drastic curtailment of passenger rights in case of severe 
delay, perhaps just moderately short of abolishing them 
entirely. As the discussed evidence has shown, delay 
compensation has been instrumental in the success of 
the policy in improving airline service quality. As long as 
improving service quality is one of the policy objectives, 
the three-hour rule should not be relaxed. 
 Compensation value: The current value of compensa-
tion may be perceived as relatively high, both compared 
to ticket prices and typical estimates of the opportunity 
cost of time. It has to be noted, however, that since the 
onset of the regulation, the real value of compensation 
has decreased by over 20% due to inflation. However, 
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there are important advantages to maintaining the cur-
rent (generous) level of compensation. First, it appar-
ently provides an effective incentive for airlines to in-
crease reliability, benefiting all passengers. Second, it 
makes claims agency business models viable, which in 
turn supports enforcement of the regulation. 
 Extraordinary circumstances: Extending the scope 
of extraordinary circumstances was one of the policy rec-
ommendations in 2013. Froms a service quality perspec-
tive, it is clear that penalizing airlines for events outside 
their sphere of influence, such as volcanic eruptions, 
does not lead to any improvements, while the un-
bounded care condition imposed on airlines is a poten-
tial threat to the airlines’ financial stability. Suggested 
remedies, such as the introduction of an EU-wide fund 
financed by an airline ticket tax to deal with rare events, 
such as a volcano ash clouds, may sound attractive. How-
ever, the administrative costs of such a solution need to 
be assessed against commercial insurance.  
Conclusion 
Our study shows that the EC261 regulation is highly effective 
in reducing flight delays. The regulation imposes significant 
costs on carriers for long flight delays, thus creating financial 
incentives for airlines to reduce such delays.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Although the regulation includes a threshold above which the 
rules apply, we do not observe any threshold behaviour. In-
stead, all flights benefit from the delay decrease. The major-
ity of carriers operating intercontinental flights use a hub 
model, which means that even a short delay on one leg of a 
journey may be resulting in a long delay at the final destina-
tion if a connecting flight is missed. The welfare benefits of 
the regulation are enlarged by the insurance component: the 
cost of the delay imposed by the regulation that incentivizes 
the airlines is transferred to the affected passengers.  
The effectiveness of consumer rights in raising service quality 
in the airline industry holds important insights for other mar-
kets. Currently, the European Commission is reforming regu-
lations on rail passenger rights to align them with EC261. The 
experience of EC261 promises service quality improvements 
in that sector, too. One of the changes discussed includes a 
substantial increase in the level of compensation offered to 
passengers, and an important issue is whether compensation 
will continue to be capped by the ticket price. In the case of 
EC261, relatively generous (uncapped) compensation helped 
to compensate for initially weak enforcement by creating a 
market for claims agencies. Thus, the air example shows that 
uncapped compensation can have important enforcement ef-
fects.  
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